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Abstract
We introduce the concept of self-healing in the field of complex networks. Obvious applications range from
infrastructural to technological networks. By exploiting the presence of redundant links in recovering the
connectivity of the system, we introduce self-healing capabilities through the application of distributed
communication protocols granting the ”smartness” of the system. We analyze the interplay between
redundancies and smart reconfiguration protocols in improving the resilience of networked infrastructures
to multiple failures; in particular, we measure the fraction of nodes still served for increasing levels of
network damages. We study the effects of different connectivity patterns (planar square-grids, small-
world, scale-free networks) on the healing performances. The study of small-world topologies shows us
that the introduction of some long-range connections in the planar grids greatly enhances the resilience
to multiple failures giving results comparable to the most resilient (but less realistic) scale-free structures.
Introduction
Nowadays, one of the most pressing and interest-
ing scientific challenges deals with the analysis and
the understanding of processes occurring on com-
plex networks [1–9]; one of the most important tar-
get for applying the results of such a field are real
infrastructural networks. Our society critically de-
pends on the continuity of functioning of Physical
Networked Infrastructures (PNIs) like power, gas
or water distribution; securing such critical infras-
tructures against accidental or intentional malfunc-
tioning is a key issue both in Europe and in the
US [10, 11]. While most studies have been focused
on how to improve the robustness (i.e. the capabil-
ity of surviving intentional and/or random failures)
of existing networks [12], much less has been done
regarding the resilience (i.e. the capability of recov-
ering failures). In fact, the implementation of smart
(as well as economic) strategies aimed at maintain-
ing high level of performances is a crucial issue yet
to be solved.
Most of the critical PNIs are very well engi-
neered systems characterized by flow conservations
(Kirchoff’s laws); as a standard, these systems have
been designed to be N−1 robust – i.e., they should
be resilient to the loss of a single component via
automatic or human guided interventions. On the
other hand, the constantly growing size of PNIs has
increased the possibility of multiple failures which
are not considered in such N − 1 criteria. In gen-
eral, implementing robustness to any sequence of
k failures (N − k robustness) requires an exponen-
tially growing effort in means and investments; it is
therefore viable to consider implementing systems
that are on average robust to k failures. Moreover,
the continuous growth and development of PNIs
has introduced complex connectivity (as well as de-
pendence) patterns within their constitutive com-
ponents that can often trigger systematic side ef-
fects like system-wide cascades of failures. Hence,
our current and future PNIs need healing mech-
anisms that are able to cope with systemic effects
and multiple failures in an automatic and possibly
distributed way.
Healing algorithms have recently been the sub-
ject of massive investigation especially in the field
of communication [13–15] and wireless networks
[16–19]. In particular, the strategies aimed at main-
taining network connectivity assume the possibility
of creating anew communications channels among
the nodes of the networks, often with no constraints
on the number of new connections available [20].
The possibility to create new links among nodes is
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2normally not available in PNIs, where the links are
physical (fixed in advance) and creating new links
requires both time and investments.
In general, healing should be though as a con-
strained mechanism in which only a limited amount
of resources is available; as an example, in material
science new polymeric compounds are capable of
self healing due to the presence of small amounts
of healing agents that gets released and activated
upon cracking [21, 22]. An alternative strategy to
ensure the continuity of a system is given by the
redundancy of the interconnectivity of its compo-
nents; for example, when a hole is punched in a
leaf, the remaining vessels are capable to sustain the
extra flow necessary to keep the tissues alive [23];
such redundant structures are also optimal respect
to fluctuations in the flows [24]. In general, tech-
nological networks can be modeled with distance-
dependent constraints [25] that must be extended
to more sophisticated constraints like the shape of
the spectrum in the case of power grids [26].
In this paper we introduce a novel strategy to
enhance the response and resilience of networked in-
frastructures by studying the effect of randomness
and redundancy in their connectivity patterns.
As mentioned above, such an approach aims
at studying the impact and the feasibility of cost-
effective strategies to improve the resilience of phys-
ical infrastructure. In fact, we introduce a healing
strategy based on the activation of fixed redundant
resources (backup links) and study the resilience of
the networks to multiple failures. Since the pres-
ence of backup links is customary in technologi-
cal networks and our strategy can be implemented
via routing protocols, our self-healing procedure is
within the reach of current technology.
Results
Model
In our scenario the system is assumed to be a
network that distributes some utility (like water,
power, gas, oil) following Kirchoff (continuity) laws.
For sake of simplicity, we will consider a single node
to be the source of the quantity to be distributed on
the network. Moreover, at each instant of time, the
topology of the network distributing the utility (the
active tree) is assumed to be a tree. In fact, such a
structure meets the infrastructures’ managers needs
– i.e., to measure (for billing purposes) in an easy
and precise way how much of a given quantity is
served to any single node of the network. Finally,
as a further simplification we will not take into ac-
count the magnitudes of flows – i.e., all links and
sources are assumed to have infinite capacity – but
we will focus on maximizing the connectedness of
the system in order to serve as many nodes as pos-
sible.
In order to implement our strategy and its self-
healing capabilities, we consider the presence of dor-
mant backup links – i.e., a set of links that can
be switched on. Nodes are assumed to be able to
communicate with their neighbours by means of a
suitable distributed interaction protocol with a lim-
ited amount of knowledge: the set of neighbouring
nodes connected either via active or via dormant
links. Then, when either a node or a link failure oc-
curs, all the nodes below the failure will disconnect
from the active tree and become unserved. Such
unserved nodes can now try to reconnect the ac-
tive tree by waking up through the protocol some
dormant backup links. Such a process will recon-
struct a new active-tree that can restore totally or
partially the flow, i.e. heal the system.
In order to identify the system’s properties that
are able to maximize the fraction of service (FoS)
– i.e, the fraction of served nodes – we study the ef-
fects of the backup links (redundancy) disposed ac-
cording to different connectivity patterns – i.e, dif-
ferent underlying networks on top of which the ac-
tive tree is build – with respect to multiple random
failures. We start our investigation by focusing on
the case which best resembles the actual situation
of PNIs – i.e. nodes disposed over a grid. Then,
we stress the role of the networks’ connectivity pat-
terns by using small-world and scale free networks
as underlying topology. A more formal description
of the model is provided in the section Methods.
Materials
In order to stress the peculiarities of different net-
work structures, we generate class of graphs with
different connectivity patterns (see Methods ): the
planar square grid (SQ), the scale-free (SF ) topol-
ogy of Barabasi-Albert [27] and the small world
(SW ) of Watts and Strogatz [28]. For each of these
networks, the source node – i.e, the root of the ori-
3ented active tree - is chosen at random within all
the nodes of the underlying network. The only ex-
ception is the case of the SF networks where we
use, according to the preferential attachment prin-
ciple, the natural choice of having the node with the
highest number of neighbours (the central hub) as
the source.
For each kind of network structures, we gener-
ate the associated random spanning trees [29] (sec-
tion Methods). We take such spanning trees as the
initial configuration of our model distribution net-
works. The links not belonging to the spanning
trees form the set of the possible backup links of
our system; among such links, we choose a random
fraction r of dormant links that can be used to heal
the system. We then simulate the occurrence of un-
correlated multiple failures by deleting at random
k links of the initial active tree. Notice that link
failures are the most general ones, as a node failure
is equivalent to the simultaneous failure of all its
links.
Our self-healing algorithm is a routing protocol
(see section Methods) whose goal is to reconstruct
the maximum spanning tree connected to the source
after that a failure has occurred; in doing so, we
use both the survived links of T and the dormant
links D; fig.1 illustrates such procedure. We indi-
cate with FoS the fraction of nodes connected to
the source after the recovery.
(a) Initial configuration (b) Link failure (c) Recovered network
Figure 1. (Color online) Example of healing after single link failure. Notice that failure of a single
node can be modelled as the failure of all its links; hence, multiple links failure are the more general
event to be considered. (Left Panel) In the initial state, the source node (filled square, upper left
corner) is able to serve all 16 nodes through the links of the active tree. The 4 dashed lines (green
online) represent dormant backup links that can be activated upon failure. The redundancy of the
system is p = 4/9 as at most 9 backup links can be present. The link marked with an X is the one that
is going to fail. (Central panel) A single link failure disconnects all the nodes of a sub-tree; in the
example, a sub-tree of 6 nodes (red online) is left isolated from the source – i.e., the system has a
damage ∆ = 6). (Right Panel) By activating a single dormant backup link, the self-healing protocol has
been able to recover connectivity for the whole system, in this case bringing back the number of served
nodes at its maximum value 16. The link that has recovered the connectivity is marked with an R.
Results on different networks
In order to test the performances of our healing al-
gorithm to failures in terms of fraction of service
provided after the active tree restoration, we sim-
ulate the model for increasing number of failures.
Recalling that each failure causes a cascade – i.e,
each node of sub-tree served by the broken link is
unserved – we investigate the role of redundancy r
on different topologies.
We start our study by addressing planar square
grid (SQ) networks that are the most similar to the
real physical networked infrastructures. In the first
scenario, we generate spanning trees on a square
grids; figure 2(a) shows the variation of the restored
FoS respect to the number of failures k for different
4redundancies rs. For square grids, we do not ob-
serve any relevance of the redundancy on the FoS;
this means that a very small fraction backup links
(r = 0.1, i.e. 10%) already suffice to attain the
maximum resilience.
The situation is completely different when the
underlying topology is a scale-free network gener-
ated through the Barabasi-Albert model [27]. A
widely diffused property of real networks is that
the connectivity pattern follows a scale-free power-
law distribution [30–32]. This feature has been
found to be a consequence of the so called preferen-
tial attachment – i.e networks expand continuously
through the addition of new vertices which attach
preferentially to already well connected nodes. Al-
though technological networks do not show power
law degree distributions due to economic and spa-
tial constraints [33], we choose to investigate SF
networks for their marked robustness upon random
failures [34]. For SF networks, it is natural to
choose the node with the highest degree (the hub)
as the source. The quality of service restored by
our self-healing algorithm on SF networks is shown
in Figure 2(b). As expected, we find that SF net-
works can easily recover all the nodes even for low
redundancies. Such error tolerance comes at a high
price of being extremely vulnerable to node targeted
attacks: isolating the hub disconnects the whole
system. High error tolerance and targeted attack
vulnerability are indeed generic properties of SF
networks [35].
5(a) square grid (b) scale free
(c) small world
Figure 2. (Color online) Self-healing results for networks of size 104. Panel (a): distribution networks
based on square grids . The average fraction 〈FoS〉 of nodes that the self-healing protocol is able to
restore decreases with the number of faults k with no relevant dependency on the redundancy; results
are shown for a 104 nodes network. Panel (b): distribution networks based on Barabasi-Albert networks.
The average fraction of nodes〈FoS〉 of served nodes is plotted against the number of failures k. Even
for a low 10% redundancy (r = 0.1), the system can almost totally heal after sustaining k ∼ 4× 102
failures; as a comparison, for the same number of failures square grids loose ∼ 90% of the nodes. Panel
(c): distribution grids based on small-sworld networks obtained by rewiring a fraction p = 0.2 of links.
The average fraction of nodes〈FoS〉 of served nodes is plotted against the number of failures k. At
difference with square grids and scale free networks, the restored fraction of service FoS shows a marked
dependency upon the redundancy parameter r. Similar results are obtained for p = 0.1 and p = 0.3.
We then consider the case of small-world (SW )
networks [28]. In the case of technological networks,
small world networks are important as they can
show the effects of introducing long-range links in
a planar topology. Starting from an initial graph
(planar square grids in our case), we rewire with a
probability p a link with a randomly selected node;
in this way we can interpolate from the case of SQ
networks (p = 0) to the case of a random graph
(p = 1). As in the case of simple percolation [36],
the rewiring procedure introduces some long range
links – i.e., between distant nodes on the square
6grid) that improve the robustness to random fail-
ures.
In order to understand the role of the connectiv-
ity pattern we study our model on different SW net-
works with different rewiring probabilities.In Figure
2(c) we show the performances of our self-healing
strategy with respect to an increasing number of
failures. We see that a higher rewiring probabil-
ity increases the number of served nodes after the
restoration through the backup network; such a
peculiarity shows up even if the clustering within
neighbouring nodes (normally associated to a lo-
cal robustness against failures) decreases; therefore
long range links increase the possibility of the net-
work staying connected even after multiple failures.
Finally, we compare in fig.3 the effectiveness of
the self-healing protocol across different strategies.
While distribution grids based on the SF topology
are the more robust, they should be disregarded
when considering the case of technological networks
since economic and geometric constraints make SF
networks unfeasible on planar topologies.
Figure 3. (Color online) Comparison among different network structures. Here we show the
performances of our self-healing algorithm with respect to the quality of service for increasing number
of removed links with the redundancy r fixed to 0.3; for SW networks, the rewiring probability is
p = 0.2. The average fraction of nodes〈FoS〉 of served nodes is plotted against the number of failures k.
Discussion
In this paper we have introduced a minimal proce-
dure of self-healing in networks. Such procedure ex-
ploits the presence of redundant edges to recover the
connectivity of the system. Our scenario is inspired
by real-world distribution networks that are, often
for economic reasons, tree-like and in the mean-
time are also often provided with alternative backup
links that can be activated in case of malfunction-
ing; as an example, this is the case for low-voltage
distribution networks [37].
Our model, albeit schematic, is realistic in the
sense that it could be readily and easily imple-
mented with the current technologies. In fact, rout-
ing protocols represent a vast available source of dis-
tributed algorithms able to maintain the connectiv-
ity of a system. Therefore, our scheme could be im-
7plemented by coupling an ICT network to current
infrastructures. Our case is an example in which
interdependencies enhance the resilience instead of
introducing catastrophic breakdowns [2].
We have studied the performances of our proce-
dure varying the redundancy on different network
substrates – i.e, planar square grid, scale-free and
small-world networks. Within our model, we have
shown that distribution networks akin to real world
ones - i.e, based on SQ topologies - to be the less
resilient to failures. In facts, as expected the most
robust networks are based on the SF topology that
is unrealistic for technological networks. A further
direction of study would be to consider the effects
of more detailed structural characteristics on the
dynamics of the system [38].
Our results on SW topologies hint that a very
effective strategy to strengthen planar networks is
to add long range links. The feasibility of such
a strategy depends on cost-benefit analysis about
the implementation of physical long-range links in
PNIs.
While our minimal model considers only the
connectivity of the system, it can be easily ex-
panded to take account of the magnitude of the
flows: in fact, routing algorithms can account for
both the capacity of the links and dynamically swap
re-routing of flows. Our model easily allows also for
cold starts – i.e., for situations in which the net-
work has shut down due to some major events (like
a black-out) [39]. This is an important issue as one
of the most time (and money) consuming activity
after a major event is the restoring of the function-
ality of the network.
In this paper, we have considered only the sin-
gle source case. Next step is to consider a network
served by multiple sources. The possibility of sepa-
rating a networks in separate islands is a well know
strategy to mitigate cascade failures in power grids;
for electric distribution separating the system in
trees would solve the problem of who is serving who
that appears as soon as more competitors share the
same physical line in bringing power to their cus-
tomers [40]. Moreover, the possibility for the sys-
tem of dynamically separating in time-varying trees
would allow for introducing a commodity market
based on real-time economic competition among the
owners of the sources. This further goal is not yet
within the reach of current routing protocols and
should be further investigated if we want to have
grids that are smart not only for their ability to
self-repair but also in optimizing consumptions and
prices.
Methods
The Self-Healing procedure
We consider an abstract model of a physical net-
worked infrastructure (PNI) described by the
quadruple (V, vS , EA, ED). Here V are nodes of the
network, vS ∈ V is the source node, EA is the set of
active links among the nodes and ED denotes the
set of dormant links that can be activated in order
to heal system failures by re-connecting nodes. A
node is considered to be served if it is connected to
a source through a path of active links; all the nodes
in V are initially connected to the source. As the
basic metric for any quality of service (QoS) assess-
ment, we consider the fraction of served nodes FoS
counting the number of nodes in the active graph –
i.e connected to vS .
More formally, in the initial configuration, the
graph T = (V,EA) is an instance of RT (G) – i.e,
the set of all the random spanning tree of the graph
G = (V,EA ∪ ED) with vS ∈ G. Thus, T before
the failures has |V | (active) nodes and |EA| = V −1
links among them.
We then consider the occurrence of multiple link
failures. A k-failure is a subset EF ⊂ EA of k links
chosen at random. The system right after a fail-
ure is described by the graph G′ = (V,EA − EF )
and by the set ED of dormant links available for
the healing. A healing protocol is any algorithm
that finds the maximal tree T ′ of G′ containing
the source vS by activating (waking up) a subset
EW ⊂ ED of dormant edges. For robustness, we
will assume that nodes have only a local knowledge
of the networks – i.e., only about the state (active,
dormant or failed) of their incoming links. To build
the maximal connected tree, nodes communicate
with their neighbors via a suitable distributed pro-
tocol allowing fault nodes to join the active network
by activating dormant edges. In other words, nodes
are endowed only with the minimal requirements of
routing needed to reconstruct a spanning tree [41].
In this paper, we have applied the following simple
distributed algorithm to implement self-healing:
8U ← unserved nodes
V ′ ← V − U
E′A ← (EA − EF ) ∩ (V × V )
E′D ← (ED − EF ) ∪ (EA − V × V )
repeat
for all v ∈ U do
choose a random neighbor a(v) connected to
V through any edge of E′D
for all v ∈ U do
if a(v) 6= ∅ then
V ′ = V ′ + {v}
U = U − {v}
E′A = E
′
A + {(u(v), v)}
E′D = E
′
D − {(u(v), v)}
until V ′ and U are disconnected or U = ∅
E′D ← E′D ∩ V ′ × V ′
return T ′ = (V ′, vS , E′A, E
′
D)
By definition, the nodes in T ′ are the set
of served nodes V ′. Notice that the state
(V ′, vS , EA + EW − EF , ED − EW ) still describes a
PNI; therefore, we can in general describe the
state of the system at time t by the quadruple
(V (t), vS , EA(t), ED(t)) and the sequence of time
failures between time t and t + 1 by EF (t). A gen-
eral representation of such a process can be given
in terms of time varying graph [9].
Simulations
We perform simulations on different grids (fig.4 –
upper panel) averaging over different possible initial
configuarions. To generate a random spanning tree
T associated to a graph G (fig.4 – lower panel), we
apply the exact algorithm of Wilson [29] that sam-
ples uniformly the elements of RT (G). Such span-
ning trees are taken as the initial configurations for
our model distribution networks. The links of the
graph G that do not belong to the initial configura-
tion T form the set EB of the possible backup links
of our system; of such links, only a subset ED (the
dormant links) can be used to heal the system. The
fraction r = |ED|/|EB | of such dormant links char-
acterizes the redundancy of the system: for r = 0
there are no links in ED and any failure splits the
tree, while for r = 1 any of the links of G can be
used to recompose the system.
9(a) Grid (b) Watts-Strogatz (c) Barabasi-Albert
(d) Grid (e) Watts-Strogatz (f) Barabasi-Albert
Figure 4. (Color online) Different network topologies. Upper panels, from left to right: planar square
grid (SQ), Watts-Strogatz small world network (SW) and Barabasi-Albert scale-free network (BA).
Lower panels: random spanning trees associated with the related underlying topologies in the upper
panels.
We analyze the response of the system to k-
failures. Classically, engineered systems are built
N − 1 robust, i.e. they can survive to the single
failure of any of their components. While checking
N − 1 robustness corresponds to checking all the N
possible single failures, checking the N − k robust-
ness requires to consider N !/(N − k)! ∼ Nk cases.
Therefore, checking the N − k robustness is infea-
sible even for modest values of k due to the combi-
natorial explosion of the number of possible cases.
Thus, we choose to assess on probabilistic ground
whether a system would be able to sustain k fail-
ures by a Monte Carlo investigation of the space of
possible failures.
Service operators are interested in maintaining
their service level agreements (contracts) with their
customers; to such an aim, customers must in first
pace remain connected to the services. Therefore,
we calculate the average fraction of served cus-
tomers FoS after the occurrence and the healing
of k random failures. To do so, we choose at ran-
dom k different links on the service tree and delete
them; after that, we apply the self healing proce-
dure; finally, we calculate the FoS. Such procedure
is repeated until the relative error of the average
FoS is small enough (less than 5%). As an ex-
ample, for a grid 100 × 100 of 104 nodes, we must
average over 100 sets of random failures to attain
the desired accuracy. Moreover, to average out the
different characteristics of the initial configurations,
we repeat the procedure over 100 different indepen-
dently generated initial configurations.
Notice that in our case it is more correct to
speak about N − k resilience, since we don’t con-
sider whether the system is robust to k failures (i.e.
whether it still functioning after k failures), but if
it can recover from k failures.
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